As STRATCOM receives the dreadful news of incoming Russian ICBMs, Russia also launches its SLBMs at both the United States and NATO bases in Europe. These “handmaidens of the apocalypse” then promptly disappear upon firing their payloads (238). The SecDef realizes that any further action can only lead to a nuclear holocaust. There are no other options. At this point, the only reason to launch a retaliation is to “use them or lose them” (241), as the weapons will be destroyed if they are not promptly launched.

The SecDef protests at this, wondering if “just because hundreds of millions of innocent Americans are about to die, maybe the other half of humanity—full of so many innocents—does not have to die” (241). The SecDef’s suggestion is dismissed without consideration. Deterrence depends upon the threat of retaliation even being fulfilled, even after the logic of deterrence has completely fallen apart. Unable to marshal the full legitimacy of the presidential office, the SecDef consents and authorizes a retaliatory strike against 975 targets in Russia.

ICBMs, B-52 bombers, and nuclear submarines all prepare for nuclear retaliation against Russia, understanding that their goal is simply to annihilate the other side as they face annihilation. At NATO airbases in Europe, nuclear bombs load bombers, with pilots grimly aware of how unlikely they are to survive this final takeoff.