A theory of moral sentiments should address two basic questions. First: “[W]herein does virtue consist—or what is the tone of temper, and tenor of conduct, which constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, the character which is the natural object of esteem, honor, and approbation?” (246). Second: “[B]y what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us?” (246). Smith examines other moral philosophers’ responses to the first question in Part 7, Section 2, and he addresses responses to the second question in Part 7, Section 3.

In response to the first question established above—“wherein does virtue consist?”—moral philosophers throughout history have cited propriety, prudence, benevolence, or some other factor. Smith examines each of these in the ensuing four chapters.

The list of moral philosophers for whom virtue consists in propriety includes Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno. For Plato, virtue occurred when “three different parts of our nature,” a mixture of reason and passions, “were in perfect concord with one another” (248-49).