The Afterword, by Richard E. Neustadt and Graham T. Allison, begins with an analysis of the nuclear threat in the modern age and the moral issues that accompany initiating such devastation. Analyzing alternative courses President Kennedy might have pursued in place of a blockade, they detail one sequence of events that could have resulted in a nuclear exchange and identify several other potential trigger points for nuclear launch. In their analysis, if Kennedy had tolerated the missiles in Cuba, he may have risked further Russian aggression elsewhere in the world, especially around Berlin, which would have been much more difficult for the United States to manage.

According to Neustadt and Allison, the deliberations, shifting positions, and developing circumstances make it difficult to completely and accurately chronicle Ex Comm. They outline the development of the American response, providing additional information about the specific positions and perceptions of individual participants. Neustadt and Allison provide a detailed analysis of the composition of the committee and “the extraordinary role” played by Ex Comm (114).

Aside from the President, Vice-President Lyndon Johnson was the only other elected official who attended Ex Comm meetings. President Kennedy did not even notify Congressional leaders of the crisis until the afternoon of his televised speech to the nation.