Aid agencies cannot cater to the poor, and many of well-intentioned initiatives go unchecked because the “central problem is that the poor are orphans: they have no money or political voice to communicate their needs to motivate others to meet those needs” (167). Since the aid agencies receive little feedback, if any, from the poor, and “[r]ich-country politicians control foreign aid agencies” (169), this proves to be a conundrum.

Suppliers survive only by finding what a consumer wants and satisfying their need, but aid does not work in that manner. Instead, Easterly explains, the reasons aid agencies fail to address the needs of the poor can be seen through the principal-agent analysis, where the agent acts on behalf of the principle. Rich-country politicians are the principals, while aid agencies are the agents. The issue with this relationship is that the poor should be the customers or the principal, not the rich Planners. However, due to the current setup, “[t]he agency must indulge the dreams of the rich-country principals of transforming the Rest” (170). Therefore, the aid agencies’ constraints lead to weak incentives to perform for the poor, and the efforts go unnoticed.